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In an eloquent article in a recent volume 
of  American  Psychologist,  Cohen  (2009) 
evoked a contentious question: what are 
the boundaries of culture? To Cohen, the 
extant psychological literature has been too 
limited in its almost exclusive emphasis on 
independent-interdependent self-construal 
as the prime psychological process charac-
terizing cultural variation, with the varia-
tion being limited itself to nationalities and 
an East–West division. Cohen argued that 
cultural processes are more complex and 
diverse, and cultural boundaries are more 
fine-grained.  Cohen’s  apt  critique  noted 
that many forms of culture are overlooked 
when psychologists are so limited in their 
scope.  To  expand  the  conceptual  space, 
Cohen  urged  psychologists  to  consider 
other  cultural  identities  such  as  religion, 
socioeconomic status, and regional locale, 
as well as their possible intersections.
Signifying “cultural” identities that have 
nominal labels as potential markers for cul-
ture may be interpreted to suggest that group 
membership is synonymous with cultural 
processes. Cohen’s view is more sophisti-
cated than that. However, the emphasis on 
nominal  groupings  such  as  religion  and 
SES – to which we could add race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, disability status, etc. – 
does raise the question: What do these social 
groups have to do with culture? We argue 
that a focus on shared meanings of experi-
ences, rather than nominal social groupings, 
is a more appropriate and productive path 
toward achieving Cohen’s goal of expanding 
and refining our understanding of cultural-
psychological processes.
There are several issues that we believe 
are pertinent to the relations between social 
groups and culture. One is the important 
recognition that all nominal groupings are 
themselves  cultural  constructions:  social 
schemas that emerged through social inter-
action in particular contexts to fulfill con-
ceptual and practical functions in ritualized 
social life. The meanings of these nominal 
groupings have very fuzzy boundaries that 
render group inclusion criteria messy; they 
change continuously; and they reflect the 
purposes of those employing the categories 
more than the characteristics of the group 
members. Clearly this is the case with the 
more obviously malleable categories: low 
SES means quite different things and the 
category would include people with dif-
ferent  economic  characteristics  depend-
ing on the country, the historical period, 
the political result of deliberations among 
economists, the purpose of the researchers, 
and the access to different kinds of data. 
But, even social categories that in layper-
son terms have essential properties, such 
as gender, have previously taken on differ-
ent meanings and continue to have fuzzy 
and dynamic boundaries, as is apparent by 
those whose lifestyles challenge the reifica-
tion of these labels (e.g., GLBT). As cultural 
phenomena, nominal groupings should be 
themselves a topic for study in cultural psy-
chology as they are in other scholarly fields 
(Brubaker, 2009).
Even  more  pertinent  to  the  current 
opinion is the understanding, which not 
incidentally is shared by Cohen, that each 
grouping includes people – self-identified 
or otherwise – who differ in many signifi-
cant cultural-psychological characteristics 
and dimensions. By focusing on the nomi-
nal group, psychologists are running the risk 
of over-looking more significant processes; 
and, clearly, of stereotyping.
This is not to say that group membership 
has no significance to cultural-  psychological 
processes. Whereas nominal groupings do 
not have ontological existence, they are an 
important element in the social-political 
reality. The cultural-political construction 
of  certain  groupings  creates  experiences 
that are shared by group members in ways 
that may, indeed, result in cultural proc-
esses. The category of “immigrant” could 
serve as a case in point. While far from being 
equalized across all immigrant groups, US 
immigration  policy  does  treat  similarly 
people who may otherwise share very   little 
with  each  other  (e.g.,  language,  beliefs, 
values, lifestyles), except for their immi-
gration experience. Similar treatment may 
result with some shared meaning about the 
immigration experience. Such shared expe-
riences may manifest, perhaps, in a relieved 
understanding smile exchanged by two very 
different people after finishing the lengthy 
admission process at JFK’s INS offices; to 
borrow from Geertz (1973) – “a speck of 
behavior, a fleck of culture, and – voilà! – a 
gesture” (p. 6).
Of course, as Geertz noted, “that…is just 
the beginning” (p. 6). The prevalent effects 
of social-political grouping – be they the 
consequence of formal policy or informal 
perceptions and norms – may result in col-
lective experiences (e.g., discrimination, dif-
ferential opportunities, expected behavior), 
which, in turn, may lead to shared meanings 
and hence to cultural-psychological proc-
esses:  cognitive,  emotional,  motivational, 
and  behavioral  manifestations  of  those 
shared meanings. These processes clearly 
merit investigation and intervention.
Yet, it would be a grave mistake to assume 
a priori that each immigrant to the US – 
or, each attendant to a Christian church, 
each citizen earning under $30,000, each 
resident of a south-western state – shared 
the  same  experiences  or  made  the  same 
meaning of collective experiences. Perhaps 
the cultural-psychological processes most 
relevant for understanding these people’s 
actions in particular contexts are rooted in 
shared experiences that cut across social cat-
egories: attending the same public school; 
commuting during rush hour; relocating 
after a flood….
There  is  a  seeming  tension  between 
understanding  that,  on  the  one  hand, 
nominal groupings are dynamic cultural 
constructions; group members are psycho-
logically and culturally diverse; social group 
labels, or “cultural” identities, are, in fact, not 
synonymous with culture; and recognizing 
on the other hand that despite their non-
essentialist nature, group   memberships may Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cultural Psychology    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 199  |  2
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Perhaps  these  conclusions  are  similar 
to those Cohen aimed at. We are in full 
agreement with his challenge to the cur-
rently dominant paradigm that focuses on 
a small number of dimensions generalized 
across broad nominal categories. However, 
following many others (e.g., Bruner, 1990; 
Betancourt and Lopez, 1993; Shweder and 
Sullivan,  1993),  we  caution  against  the 
emphasis on nominal group labels as the 
obvious and unproblematic entry point for 
conceptualizing and investigating cultural-
psychological processes.
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involve common experiences that result in 
some cultural processes. What may psychol-
ogists interested in cultural-psychological 
processes do?
One way to address this challenge is by care-
ful reflection on the formulation of research 
questions. Arguably,  cultural-psychological 
processes  emerge  from  and  manifest  in 
shared experiences in lived contexts (Cole 
et al., 1997). Researchers might begin with 
those lived contexts that play important roles 
in people’s lives and seek the shared meanings 
of actions in these contexts. Indeed, many cul-
tural psychology researchers already practice 
such a perspective (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2004; 
Sherry et al., 2006). In turn, researchers who 
are interested in the role of the social-political 
reality of social groups in culture ought to 
pose research questions with acute sensitiv-
ity to social-political-  historical processes and 
should proceed with the awareness that group 
memberships are cultural constructions and, 
consequently, political realities rather than 
reified entities.